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Abstract—Police investigations involving digital evidence tend
to focus on forensic examination of storage units on personal
electronic devices (laptops, smartphones, etc). However, a number
of factors are making digital forensic tools increasingly ineffec-
tive: (i) storage capacities of electronic devices have increased,
and so has the amount of personal information held on them;
(ii) cyber crimes are increasingly committed on social media,
and evidence of crimes are held on social media platforms, not
necessarily on personal devices; (iii) there is a greater need for
protecting digital privacy, especially when examining digital evi-
dence from witnesses and victims of cyber crimes. These factors
pose a number of practical challenges for both law enforcement
agencies and citizens when disclosing and handling the digital
evidence. This paper defines and illustrates the key challenges,
and proposes the concept of verifiable limited disclosure, which
defines a communication protocol to ensure privacy, continuity
and integrity of digital evidence. More specifically, the protocol
allows (i) citizens to decide what evidence to disclose to law
enforcement agencies and (ii) any of the two parties to be able
to prove any tampering of the disclosed evidence. The paper
discusses methods for implementing the communication protocol
using standard security and privacy tools and presents a pathway
to evaluating their effectiveness.
Index Terms—Digital Forensic, Social Media, Cyber Crimes,
Digital Privacy
I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Police investigations involving digital evidence tend to focus
on forensic examination of digital storage units partly because
evidence for many offences can be gathered from web brows-
ing history, emails, chats, as well as photos and other files
stored on those devices. In this “image and search” approach,
the law enforcement agencies take cryptographically secure
disk copies of storage units and search for evidence on the
disk copies so that the integrity of evidence is preserved.
A YouGov online survey between 16 and 17 March 2015
shows that the average British household owns 7.4 internet
devices such as smartphones and laptops [1]. Similarly, a
survey conducted by Pew Research Center between 17th
March and 12th April 2015 shows that about 1 in 3 Americans
own three devices: a smartphone, a computer and a tablet [2].
With increasing availability of high capacity storage units
(100s of gigabytes, or terabytes are increasingly common),
together with high volumes of data people store on them,
this “image and search” approach is increasingly inefficient.
Even the process of triaging, i.e, the initial assessment process
where cases are filtered and prioritised by digital forensic
experts, is coming under increasing pressure. For example,
London Metropolitan Police services receive over 38,000 dig-
ital devices a year for digital forensic examination, a situation
described as “resource overload” [3].
Beside the challenges associated with the current digital
forensic technologies, online crime patterns are also changing.
Criminal offences on social media, primarily Facebook and
Twitter platforms, now constitute the bulk of all criminal cases
investigated by the UK police forces [4]. This emerging class
of social media offences include “cyber bullying”, “trolling”
and “virtual mobbing”.
When investigating such offences, the traditional digital
forensic method has limited effectiveness for two main rea-
sons. First, it is the social media organisations, not necessarily
the devices used by citizens, that may hold the evidence relat-
ing to offences committed on the social media. For example,
Facebook has the entire history of a user’s activities, but the
user’s smartphone may not. However, social media organisa-
tions sometimes decline requests for information. For example,
in the second half of 2015, Twitter received 427 requests for
information (the highest since 2012) from law enforcement
agencies in the United Kingdom1. Twitter complied partially
or fully in 76% of requests relating to 956 Twitter, Periscope,
and Vine accounts. In contrast, in the second half of 2012,
it received 25 requests for information, and only in 4% of
the cases relating to 27 accounts yielded some information.
Although UK law enforcement agencies are making many
more requests for information, and are more successful, some
requests for information are still resisted by social media
companies such as Twitter2.
Second, electronic devices sent for forensic examination are
typically seized during arrest of suspects. A suspect under
police investigation may not have strong claims for digital
privacy. Moreover, with social media offences, a person may
come forward voluntarily to give evidence as a witness and/or
a victim. In such cases, protecting the digital privacy of the
person could encourage cooperation and increase public trust.
Since anonymous crime reporting has been a common practice,
those who report cyber crimes should also be able to maintain
their digital privacy.
1https://transparency.twitter.com/country/uk
2Tweets are normally public, and therefore requests for information must
relate to non-public information such as user’s identity, location, and deleted
tweets. Recent new features of Twitter allow tweets within a smaller group
and between individuals, which could be the subject of future requests.
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Fig. 1. Collecting Digital Evidence on Social Media
However, evidence collection and handling methods for
social media crimes lack technical sophistication. For example,
Facebook gives the following advice for evidence collection
in case of cyber bullying on its platform3.
Is someone at risk of physical harm? Contact your
local law enforcement immediately if you’re worried
about the safety of the person reaching out to you.
Take screenshots of all bullying posts, and print them
out to save.
Screenshots and printouts are not reliable digital evidence,
and evaluating their continuity and integrity later by law
enforcement agencies could be a slow and laborious process.
What is needed is an evidence collection process that is
forensically sound (irrespective of whether it is for a suspect,
a victim or a witness), so that there can be no question about
mishandling of the evidence by any party involved.
In summary, when collecting evidence for social media
offences, the “image and search” approach could be slow,
ineffective, and potentially inappropriate in terms of digital
privacy. The current “print screen and print out” approach also
suffers from the same deficiencies.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section presents a scenario for evidence collection
for social media offences, and discusses the requirements for
potential solutions.
A. Scenario
Charlie uses the social media platform SM (see Fig. 1).
Typically, his activities on SM include creating, reading and
viewing content (messages, photos, videos, comments, likes,
rating, etc). These activities can be ordered chronologically
along a timeline. All the information is hosted on the servers
of SM, and Charlie may use multiple devices at different
times to access SM. On 1-Jan-15, after Charlie uploaded two
photos (photo5 and photo9), both Sam and Tom commented
on them. Charlie considers Tom’s comment words7 in breach
of criminal laws. Charlie contacts the police officer Bob, who
asks for information about all his activities between 1-Jan-15
and 4-Jan-15. Charlie wants to comply with Bob’s request.
B. Possible Approaches
There are a number of approaches Charlie can use when
reporting evidence to Bob, including:
3https://www.facebook.com/help/420576171311103/
(1) Charlie hands over his smartphone to Bob who performs
the “image and search” approach on storage units.
(2) Charlie takes a screenshot, and prints out the relevant
part of the time line (removing what he thinks is irrele-
vant/private), and gives it to Bob.
(3) Bob asks SM to show the relevant parts of Charlie’s
timeline with his consent (assuming that SM complies
with all requests from Bob).
Charlie may not want to hand over his device (1), or give
Bob direct access to his entire timeline (3) due to privacy
concerns. The fact that Charlie is not in control of what Bob
can learn from his device and his SM activities may discourage
him from reporting crimes. If however Charlie has full control
over the evidence he discloses (1) and (2), then Bob has to
check with SM to ensure that the evidence he receives from
Charlie is accurate. This could be a resource expensive process
for Bob.
C. Requirements
Practical evidence collection methods for social media
crimes have to address the issues identified in Section II-B.
We now formulate these issues as requirements for a soft-
ware system that supports an evidence collection method for
social media crimes. We identify three main requirements as
discussed below.
Requirement 1: Charlie does not over-disclose: Charlie never
has to reveal more information than Bob’s request, to which
Charlie has agreed. In other words, Charlie has some ways of
maintaining his digital privacy.
Requirement 2: Charlie and Bob cannot lie: Charlie can prove
to the world that the evidence he gives to Bob has not been
modified by him. Likewise, Bob can prove to the world that
the evidence he uses in his investigation has not been modified
by him.
Requirement 3: Charlie and Bob cannot conceal : Charlie can
prove to the world that he has not withheld evidence relevant
to Bob’s request. Likewise, Bob can prove to the world that
he has not withheld evidence revealed to him by Charlie.
These three requirements are about maintaining privacy,
continuity and integrity of evidence. In some sense, these
requirements are an elaboration of the phrase “the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the relevant truth”. The
first requirement deals with “the relevant truth”, the third
requirement with “the whole truth” and the second requirement
with “nothing but the truth”.
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Fig. 2. Communication Protocol for Verifiable Limited Disclosure
In addition to these requirements, there are two auxiliary
requirements, namely: (i) automation: much of the tasks
involved should be done automatically, therefore quickly, with
little or no human involvement, (ii) usability: the system
should be usable with little or no training of the users. These
requirements deal with the problem of “resource overload”.
III. VERIFIABLE LIMITED DISCLOSURE
This paper proposes the concept of verifiable limited dis-
closure in order to satisfy the requirements described in
Section II-C.
• We use the term “disclosure” to mean a witness, a victim,
or a suspect of a cyber crime giving evidence to law
enforcement agencies.
• “Limited disclosure” means that (i) the evidence disclosed
must be relevant to a potential crime, and (ii) reasonable
concerns for digital privacy must be respected.
• “Verifiable” means if evidence is mishandled either de-
liberately or accidentally, then it is possible to prove that
evidence has been tampered with.
A. Protocol
Verifiable limited disclosure can be achieved by means of
a protocol that uses two main security tools: cryptographic
hash function and public key encryption. The key actors in
this protocol and their communication are shown in Fig. 2.
The main steps in the protocol are as follows:
1 Bob requests section s of Charlie’s timeline (s could be
1-Jan-15 to 4-Jan-15)
2 Charlie announces his public key (PKCharlie) to the
world
3 Charlie requests encrypted timeline from FB
4 FB encrypts every object in Charlie’s timeline using
PKCharlie
5 FB computes the cryptographic hash value (CHVk) of
all encrypted objects along Charlie’s timeline
6 FB announces CHVk and its timestamp to the world
7 Charlie decrypts a section of his timeline and gives the
entire timeline to Bob.
8 Bob encrypts the decrypted section of Charlie’s timeline,
computes the hash value and compares it to the one
announced by SM in Step 6
This protocol satisfies (a) Requirement 1 because Charlie
chooses the section of the timeline he decrypts and Bob cannot
read anything else on his timeline and (b) Requirement 2
because if Charlie modifies anything in his timeline, Bob can
prove the modification by means of a mismatched hash value.
The protocol does not satisfy the Requirement 3 because if
Charlie hides anything, such as his comments words11, then
Bob has no way of knowing about the concealment. Similarly,
if Bob withholds evidence revealed to him by Charlie, Charlie
cannot prove that Bob is withholding evidence (because Bob
can claim that the evidence is in the encrypted part).
Therefore, in order to handle Requirement 3, it is necessary
to disclose the metadata indicating the activity counts on each
day. For example, the metadata can state that there are 4 items
on Charlie’s timeline on 1-Jan-15, where Charlie first uploaded
two pictures, followed by Sam’s like, Tom’s comment, and
Charlie’s comment, in that order. Obviously disclosing all of
Charlie’s metadata will not satisfy Requirement 1. Alterna-
tively, Bob can check with SM to see if Charlie’s response
contains any concealment. This creates extra work for both
Bob and SM.
B. Handling Metadata
A different way to handle the meta-data is to partially
encode it into the timeline data. When SM encrypts, every
encrypted object contains the timestamp of the previous and
the next object along Charlie’s timeline, as shown in Tab. I.
The second photo Charlie uploaded, photo9, now contains the
timestamp of the previous object photo5, and the timestamp
of the next object, photo5. This scheme only focuses on
timestamps of objects but it is easy to extend it to actions, as
well as relations between actions and objects (such as ’like’).
For reasons of space, we omit those details.
TABLE I
FULLY-SEQUENCED OBJECTS IN CHARLIE’S TIMELINE
· · ·•
Charlie uploaded (ts(...);photo5;ts(photo9)), (ts(photo5);photo9;ts(photo5))
Sam liked (ts(photo9);photo5;ts(words7))
Tom commented (ts(photo5);words7;ts(photo9)) on (ts(words7);photo9;ts(words11))
Charlie commented (ts(photo9);words11;ts(words7)) on
(ts(words11);words7;ts(words23)).
· · ·•
Sam commented (ts(words7);words23;ts(catpic202)) on
(ts(words23);catpic202;ts(catpic391))
Tom shared (ts(catpic202);catpic391;ts(...)).
Returning to the problem of Charlie withholding words11,
it is clear that with this new data structure, Charlie will be
found out because decrypting words7 will reveal that the
4timestamp of the next object is within the date range Bob
is interested in. In order for the timstamps to join up, Charlie
cannot do anything but reveal all the objects Bob has requested
to see. Therefore, Charlie has to reveal everything until the
timestamps fall outside the range, without hiding anything in
between. Concealment of relevant information by Bob can be
proved in the same way (but less directly). When applied to
this revised data structure, the protocol will satisfy all three
requirements discussed in Section II-C.
C. Discussion
In addition to the three requirements, the protocol also
satisfies the automation requirement because all verification
tasks are performed by the hashing and encryption algorithms.
For example, Bob can automatically check the integrity of
Charlie’s evidence. Evaluation of the usability requirement
depends on particular implementation and interaction design
choices, and therefore will be examined in our future work.
The protocol design can also be used in other applications as
well. Recently there has been some public discussions around
the use of forensic evidence from smartphones in case of traffic
accidents in New York [5] (potentially on the basis of “implied
consent”, because searching a smartphone without a warrant is
illegal there). A protocol for verifiable limited disclosure can
be used to disclose for example, only the texting activities on
the phone within a time range.
Having said that, the current protocol design has some
limitations. First of all, it assumes that the information is
chronologically ordered (along a timeline) and Bob’s requests
are for specific time ranges. However, if Bob has requests
that do not fit the timeline, such as all comments posted to
a specific friend, then the request cannot be handled without
violating Requirement 3. Secondly, the protocol uses public-
key encryption where key management can be a difficult issue.
There is currently limited software support for “open-source
evidence collection” especially for social media offences.
Existing tools rarely provide the degree of integrity needed in
forensic processes. For example, Huber et. al. [6] developed
data harvesting methods for online social networks without
addressing the issues of privacy, continuity and integrity of
evidence. Therefore, such tools are only useful for initial
investigations.
The use of steganographic techniques to disguise ille-
gal communications on social media is an important issue.
Chee [7] presents an evaluation of steganographic techniques
on a number of popular social neworks.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Traditional digital forensic tools are increasingly ineffective
due to the vast amounts of data stored on digital devices.
Moreover, when investigating crimes on the social media, the
evidence is usually held on external servers, rather than on
personal devices.
We have proposed a protocol to implement the notion
of verifiable limited disclosure that satisfies a number of
requirements for privacy, continuity and integrity of digital
evidence. The protocol uses the public-key encryption and
cryptographic hashing function.
In future, we plan to develop a working prototype of this
protocol and evaluate it with real data. Initially, we plan to
develop new methods for encoding meta-data in order to sup-
port arbitrary queries. We also plan to investigate alternative
architectures to simplify the interactions between Bob, Charlie
and the social media platform, so that they can communicate
securely but not necessarily using the public-key infrastructure.
The current protocol requires a degree of cooperation from
social media companies in Steps 4 , 5 and 6 , namely en-
crypting and computing and publishing hash values. Although
these operations are not computationally expensive, there is
currently no legal and business framework within which this
cooperation might take place. In our view, the advantages of
using the proposed protocol outweigh the costs for all parties
involved.
Although evidence collection is treated as a reactive process,
we will explore how it can be done more proactively using
adaptive approaches [8].
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